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A constant social discount rate cannot re°ect both a reasonable op-
portunity cost of public funds and an ethically defensible concern for
generations in the distant future. We use a model of hyperbolic dis-
counting that achieves both goals. We imbed this discounting model
in a simple climate change model to calculate \constant equivalent
discount rates" and plausible levels of expenditure to control climate
change. We compare these results to discounting assumptions and
policy recommendations in the Stern Review on Climate Change.
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Public projects that provide bene¯ts in the distant future rise or fall on
discounting assumptions. The recent debate on The Stern Review on Cli-
mate Change (Stern 2006) is a case in point. The Review recommends
expenditures on greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement substantially larger than
those suggested by other Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs { numerical
models that combine economic and climate modules). Several commenta-
tors, including Dasgupta (2007a,b), Nordhaus (2006) and Weitzman (2007)
claim that these results are due to unreasonable assumptions about the so-
cial discount rate. We use a model of hyperbolic discounting to assess the
plausibility of both the assumptions and the policy recommendations in the
Stern Review.
The controversy turns on the parameters of the social discount rate. Let
µ(¿) be the present value of a unit of utility ¿ time periods in the future,
and let u0 (ct+¿) equal marginal utility of consumption at that time. The
discount factor for consumption, µ(¿)u0 (ct+¿), equals the number of dollars
that a social planner would be willing to sacri¯ce today (time t) in order to
obtain one more unit of consumption at time t+¿. The social discount rate,
r(¿;t + ¿), is the rate of decrease of this quantity:
r(¿;t + ¿) = ½(¿) + ´ (ct+¿)g (ct+¿); (1)
where ½ = ¡_ µ=µ is the pure rate of time preference, ´ = ¡(u00=u0)c is the
elasticity of marginal utility and g = _ c=c is the growth rate in per-capita
consumption. The baseline Stern parameters are ½ = 0:1%, ´ = 1 and
g = 1:3%, implying r = 1:4%, which is far lower than rates used in other
IAMs (see, e.g., Nordhaus 1999).
The debate about discounting in the Stern Review has been framed in
a manner that is unlikely to lead to the emergence of a consensus. The
problem is that the standard representation of the social discount rate is
too parsimonious. The social discount rate is a valuable parameter for
1summarizing a model, but a single number (resulting from constant values
of the parameters on the right side of equation (1)) cannot capture both
inter-generational equity over a long time scale and the opportunity cost of
public funds.
Our suggestion for assessing discounting parameters in climate change
models is to begin with a time-varying social discount rate that re°ects both
a reasonable degree of inter-generational equity (the long run considerations)
and the opportunity cost of public funds. We imbed this discount function
in a transparent climate change model. This model captures the risk of
climate-related damage and the inertia in the climate system. That inertia
leads to a delayed relation between current actions and future reductions in
risk. This model extends Karp and Tsur (2007) by including exogenous
growth in consumption, g, a necessary feature in order for equation (1) to be
useful.
In some cases it is possible to construct a \constant equivalent discount
rate", i.e. a single number that, if used as the social discount rate, would lead
to policy prescriptions identical to those obtained under the time-varying
social discount rate. This constant-equivalent discount rate depends on
the time-varying social discount rate, which should be the same function
for all public projects. The constant-equivalent discount rate also depends
on the speci¯cs of the problem, in particular the longevity of the public
project. For example, decisions about climate policy may a®ect welfare over
many centuries, while a decision about a bridge may a®ect welfare over a
century. The di®ering time scale of these two types of public projects means
that the constant-equivalent discount rates corresponding to them may be
very di®erent, even though both are based on the same time-varying social
discount rate. The constant-equivalent discount rate for the climate project
is more sensitive to social discount rates in the distant future. A comparison
of the constant equivalent discount rates with the rates used in IAMs helps
2to assess the reasonableness of the latter.1
There are at least three plausible reasons why the social discount rate
is a decreasing function of time. First, uncertainty about future growth
rates means that the \certainty equivalent" discount rate is likely to fall over
time; therefore, the constant-equivalent discount rate tends to be smaller for
projects that produce bene¯ts at a more distant point in the future (Weitz-
man 1998, 1999). Second, if there is imperfect substitutability between
produced goods and the natural environment, and if the supply of produced
goods increases while the stock of the natural environment falls, the social
discount rate may fall over time (Traeger 2004, Hoel and Sterner 2007).
We emphasize the third source of time-dependence: hyperbolic discount-
ing due to a decrease in the pure rate of time preference. This rate is positive
if we prefer an increase in utility sooner rather than later; 1 + ½(¿) is (ap-
proximately) the number of units of utility we would be willing to surrender
at time ¿ + d¿ to obtain one more unit of utility at time ¿. If we prefer the
youngest generation currently alive to the next, not-yet-born generation, ½
should be positive in the near term. We may be less able to distinguish be-
tween two contiguous generations in the distant future { they appear \more
similar" than two contiguous generations in the near future, implying that ½
falls over time. Arrow (1999) notes that \agent-relative ethics suggests that
each generation will maximize a weighted sum of its own utility and the sum
of utility of all future generations, with less weight on the latter. At the very
least, really distant generations are treated all alike." Cropper et al. (1994)
¯nd that questionnaire respondents weight returns to people living 100 years
1Our approach to evaluating the choice of social discount rates in some respects re-
sembles the approach in Weitzman (1999). Both recognize that the social discount rate
depends on the time scale of the project. There are important di®erences, however. Weitz-
man emphasizes non-constant discounting arising from uncertain growth rates, whereas we
begin with hyperbolic discounting, and the uncertainty in our model is due to a climate-
related event. In addition, he is interested in the certainty equivalent social discount rate
used to evaluate a payo® at a point in time in the future. We are interested in a constant
equivalent discount rate used to evaluate a trajectory of payo®s.
3from now only slightly more than people living 200 years from now, a result
consistent with hyperbolic but not with exponential discounting.
Nordhaus (1999) and Mastrandrea and Schneider (2001) imbed hyper-
bolic discounting in IAMs, in order to show the importance of long run dis-
counting in determining climate change policy. These authors assume that
the decision-maker in the current period can choose the entire policy trajec-
tory, thus solving by assumption the time-inconsistency problem (which is a
consequence of hyperbolic discounting).
The time-inconsistency of optimal programs is a plausible feature of the
policy problem: politicians, like other mortals, tend to procrastinate in solv-
ing di±cult problems. Because of the long time scale over which policies
must be implemented, we think that the restriction to Markov perfection
provides a reasonable description of the policy problem. There are multi-
ple equilibria in this setting, but these can be bounded in a simple manner.
We compare this set of equilibria to a benchmark (called \restricted com-
mitment") in which the policymaker's set of feasible policies is restricted in
such a way as to cause the resulting optimal choice to be time consistent.
This outcome is not plausible, but it provides a useful comparison to the set
of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE), and because of its optimality and time
consistency it has a simple welfare interpretation.
The next section describes our extension of Karp and Tsur (2007), pro-
viding only enough detail for this paper to be self-contained. The follow-
ing section calibrates the hazard and discounting parameters; the resulting
time-varying social discount rate re°ects a reasonable opportunity cost of
public funds and a degree of inter-generational equity. We then calculate
the constant equivalent social discount rates and suggest plausible levels of
expenditure to reduce the risk of climate-related damage.
42 The model
The model incorporates hyperbolic discounting, exogenous growth, and un-
certainty about the timing of a catastrophic event (Tsur and Zemel 1996,
Alley et al. 2003). We ¯rst describe the payo® corresponding to di®erent
actions and states, and then discuss the relation between actions and risk.
The ¯nal subsection describes the two types of equilibria corresponding to
the di®erent assumptions about the regulator's ability to commit to future
actions.
2.1 The payo®
The \catastrophe"occurs abruptly at a random date, reducing income by
the fraction ¢ (the income-at-risk) from the occurrence time onward. At
each point in (continuous) time, society has a choice between two actions:
\business as usual (BAU)" and \stabilization". The next section describes
the e®ects of these two actions; here we describe their costs. BAU costs
nothing, and stabilization costs the fraction X¢ of the °ow of income. The
parameter X is the fraction of the income-at-risk that we need to spend in
order to stabilize. The control variable, w(t) 2 f0;1g is a switch: w(t) = 0
means that at time t society follows BAU, and w(t) = 1 means that at time
t society stabilizes.
Consumption grows at an exogenous constant rate g, and the utility of
consumption is iso-elastic, with the constant elasticity ´.2 With initial con-
sumption normalized to 1, the °ow of consumption prior to the catastrophe
is egt(1 ¡ ¢Xwt) and utility is
u(c(t);w(t)) =




2This model does not contain capital, so it does not distinguish between income and
consumption. The model is consistent with a neoclassical growth model in which capital
and income grow at a constant rate, and the savings rate is constant. It is also consistent
with a model in which all expenditures for climate control are deducted from consumption,
so that climate policy does not a®ect aggregate savings or the trajectory of income.
5After the event occurs, income falls to egt (1 ¡ ¢) and there is no role for
stabilization.
































































where ET denotes expectation with respect to the random occurrence time.
We express the equilibria as a function of x, a parameter proportional to
the utility cost of stabilization:
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Figure 1 shows the graphs of X(x) for ´ = 1 and ´ = 4 when ¢ = 0:2.3
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Figure 1: Graphs of X(x) when ¢ = 0:2 for ´ = 4 (solid) and ´ = 1 (dotted).
The utility discount factor is the convex combination of exponential func-
tions
µ(t) = ¯e
¡°t + (1 ¡ ¯)e
¡±t; (7)
with 0 < ¯ < 1. This function permits a simple calibration, it allows for
substantial °exibility, and it implies a declining pure rate of time preference.
In view of expression (5), we de¯ne the \e®ective discount factor", a function
that incorporates both the pure rate of time preference and the e®ect of ´
and g:
~ µ(t) ´ µ(t)e
g(1¡´)t = ¯e
¡~ °t + (1 ¡ ¯)e
¡~ ±t; (8)
where
~ ° = ° + g (´ ¡ 1) (9a)
3For the logarithmic case (´ = 1), equation (6) reduces to X = (1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¢)x)=¢.
7and
~ ± = ± + g (´ ¡ 1): (9b)
The \e®ective discount rate" is the rate of decrease of ~ µ(t).
When ´ 6= 1 and g 6= 0 this model has one degree of freedom: for given ¯,
the \e®ective discount rate" depends on ~ ° and ~ ±, determined by two equations
in three unknowns, ±, °, and g. These parameters, unlike ´, do not enter
the function U, de¯ned in equation (4). We normalize by setting ° = 0.4
This normalization implies that the long run pure rate of time preference is
0, i.e. it means that we are unwilling to transfer utility between two agents
living in the in¯nitely distant future at a rate other than one-to-one. It also
implies that the long run e®ective discount rate is g (´ ¡ 1).
2.2 The relation between actions and risk
The endogenous hazard rate, h(t), determines the probability distribution of
the occurrence time of the catastrophe. The change in the hazard is
_ h(t) = ¹(a ¡ h(t))(1 ¡ w(t)); h(0) given. (10)
This model is a simpli¯ed representation of the following situation. The ac-
tions that we take at a point in time (e.g. abatement, levels of consumption)
determine greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions levels at that time. These °ows,
and existing GHG stocks, determine the evolution of the stock of GHG. The
risk of a climate-related catastrophe, given by h(t), is a monotonic function
of the stock of GHG. We can invert this function to write the time derivative
of h as a function of h and w, as in equation (10).5
4When ´ = 1 the equilibrium is always independent of g. For ´ = 1 or g = 0, ° and ±
equal ~ ° and ~ ±. In this case, setting ° = 0 is an assumption, not a normalization.
When g > 0, the constant de¯ned in equation (3) is ¯nite if and only if ´ > 1. In
contrast, the maximand in expression (5) is de¯ned even for some values of ´ < 1, because
the hazard has an e®ect similar to discounting. For ´ · 1 we can adopt the \overtaking
criterion" to evaluate welfare.
5Let St be the stock of GHG and zt the control variable at time t; _ S = q (S;z) is
8Equation (10) implies that (for h < a, as we assume throughout) the
hazard grows most quickly when h is small. This feature means that society
is willing to spend more (i.e. tolerate a larger value of X) to stabilize when
h is small. For hazards close to the steady state, there is little bene¯t in
incurring costs in order to prevent the hazard from growing.6
This model implies that the level of the hazard, not simply the occurrence
of the catastrophe, is irreversible. Given the level of inertia in the climate
system, this assumption seems reasonable. It also simpli¯es the class of
equilibria, because it eliminates the possibility of non-monotonic outcomes
(e.g. allowing the hazard to grow and then causing it to fall).
De¯ning y(t) =
R t










The simplicity of equation (10) is important. There are conjectures on
the level of risk for di®erent types of events (such as a reversal of the ther-
mohaline circuit or a rapid increase in sea level) corresponding to di®erent
policy trajectories (e.g. BAU or speci¯c abatement trajectories). We can
use these kinds of conjectures to suggest reasonable magnitudes for the pa-
rameters of the risk model (h(0), a and ¹). There is little empirical basis
for calibrating a more complicated model.
2.3 Types of equilibria
If the decision-maker at time 0 were able to choose an arbitrary policy tra-
jectory to maximize the payo® in expression (11) subject to the constraint in
equation (10), a typical solution involves procrastination: the decision-maker
the equation of motion. Suppose that the hazard associated with the catastrophe is a
monotonic function ht = H (St); de¯ne the inverse function S = K(h) ´ H¡1(h), so
_ h = H0(S)q(S;z) = H0 (K (h))q (K (h);z):
6The results in a model in which _ h is non-monotonic in h would change in fairly obvious
ways. For example, if _ h is small when h is close to both 0 and the steady state level,
stabilization would not be worthwhile either for very small or for very large levels of h.
9decides to begin stabilization at some time in the future. For well-known
reasons, this policy is time-inconsistent.
We emphasize the situation where the decision-maker at time t can choose
the current policy w 2 f0;1g, but not future policies. The decision-maker
understands how this choice a®ects the evolution of the hazard, and forms
beliefs about how future regulators' decisions depend on the future level of the
state variable h. The resulting MPE is a Nash equilibrium to the sequential
game played by the succession of regulators. Each regulator chooses the
current decision and wants to maximize the present discounted value of the
stream of future payo®s, given by expression (11). (Each regulator rewinds
the time at which he makes the decision to t = 0.)
There are in general multiple MPE because the optimal decision for the
current regulator depends on his beliefs about the actions of subsequent
regulators. The equilibrium beliefs of the current regulator (i.e. those that
turn out to be correct) depend on his beliefs about the beliefs (and thus the
actions) of successors. There is an in¯nite sequence of these higher order
beliefs, leading to generic multiplicity of equilibria.
However, due to the binary nature of the problem, and the speci¯c form of
the hazard equation, the equilibrium set has a simple characterization. There
are upper and lower limits of X, which we denote as XU (h) and XL (h), such
that: the unique MPE is perpetual stabilization for X · XL (h); the unique
MPE is perpetual BAU for X ¸ XU (h); and there are MPE with either





there are additional MPE that involve delayed
stabilization, but we do not discuss those here.
We also consider a benchmark equilibrium, called \limited commitment",
in which the current policymaker decides between perpetual BAU and per-
petual stabilization (i.e. he can commit future generations to one of the two
policies without the possibility to switch between them in the future). This
equilibrium is time-consistent, but it is not particularly plausible. It involves
10either an unreasonable amount of commitment, or an arbitrary restriction of
the set of feasible actions. In this equilibrium, the policymaker chooses to
stabilize if and only if X · XC (h). The equilibrium is useful as a bench-
mark for two reasons: (i) it has the same structure (a critical bound) as the
MPE, and (ii) the fact that it is a constrained optimum means that it has a
simple welfare interpretation.
Our companion paper (Karp and Tsur 2007) gives the formulae for the
boundary functions corresponding to the utility cost of stabilization xU(h),
xL(h), and xC (h). These functions are independent of ¢; they depend on
the growth rate g and the utility parameter ´ via the discounting parameters
° + g(´ ¡ 1) and ± + g(´ ¡ 1). We use those formulae and equation (6) to
obtain the boundaries in terms of consumption, XL(h); XU(h) and XC (h).
These functions depend on all of the parameters of the model.
This model shows the potentially o®setting e®ects of an increase in ´.
This parameter a®ects the equilibrium by altering the \e®ective discount
rate" ½(t)+g(´¡1) and it also enters the function X(x) de¯ned in equation
(6). For g > 0, an increase in ´ increases the \e®ective discount rate"
½(t)+g(´¡1), which in turn decreases the critical values xU(h) , xL (h), and
xC (h); that is, the change makes the decision-maker less willing to sacri¯ce
current utility for future reduction in risk. However, the larger value of ´
makes the decision-maker more risk averse; it shifts up the graph of X(x), as
shown in Figure 1, so the smaller value of the critical x (resulting from the
increase in ´) might correspond to a larger value of the critical X. Thus, in
general the e®ect of ´ on X is ambiguous. For our calibration, discussed in
the next section, an increase in ´ reduces X.
113 Policy bounds and constant equivalent rates
We discuss the calibration of the model and then present the critical values
of X corresponding to the MPE and the limited commitment equilibrium.
We also present the corresponding constant equivalent pure rates of time
preference; these are the rates that would yield the same policy bounds if ½
were constant (i.e., if ¯ = 0 or ¯ = 1 or ± = °).
We obtain an exact constant equivalent discount rate because of the sim-
plicity of the model. The exact equivalence occurs if the decision rules under
both hyperbolic and constant discounting can be characterized by a single
parameter. In our problem, the single parameter is the critical value of X
below which stabilization occurs.7
3.1 Calibration
We choose the hazard parameters h(0), ¹ and a in order to satisfy: (i) under
stabilization the probability of occurrence within a century is 0.5%; (ii) in
the BAU steady state, where h = a, the probability of occurrence within a
century is 50%; and (iii) under BAU it takes 120 years to travel half way
between the initial and the steady state hazard levels. These assumptions
imply a = 0:00693147; h0 = 0:000100503 and ¹ = 0:00544875. With these
values, the probability of occurrence within a century is 15.3% under BAU,
compared to 0.5% under stabilization.
In order to be able to compare the damage estimates under our cali-
7Barro (1999) also obtains a constant equivalent discount rate, because the single pa-
rameter in his logarithmic model is the slope of the decision rule. When the decision rules
cannot be described by a single parameter, it is possible only to obtain an approximate
constant equivalent discount rate. For example, in the linear-quadratic model there exists
a linear equilibrium control rule under both constant and hyperbolic discounting. Because
this control rule involves two parameters { the slope and the intercept { it is in general
not possible to ¯nd a constant equivalent discount rate for the hyperbolic model (Karp
2005).
12bration with those used by IAMs, we de¯ne P B (t) ´ PrfT · tjBAUg
as the probability that the catastrophe occurs by time t under BAU, and
P S (t) ´ PrfT · tjStabilizationg as the corresponding probability under
stabilization. The future (time t) expected increase in damages from fol-
lowing BAU rather than stabilization, as a percentage of future income,
is D(t) =
¡
P B (t) ¡ P S (t)
¢
100¢%. For all calibrations where h(0) > 0,
limt!1 D(t) = 0, because both probabilities converge to 1.8 Figure 2 shows
the graphs of D(t) over the next millennium for ¢ = 0:05; 0:1 and 0:2. The
corresponding damages after 100 and 200 years are D(100) = f0:72; 1:43; 2:88g
and D(200) = f2:03; 4:01; 8:11g.
The Stern Review provides a range of damage estimates. Their second-
lowest damage scenario (\market impacts + risk of catastrophe") assumes
that climate-related damages equal about 1% in one century, and 5% after
two centuries. Our calibration with ¢ = 0:05 implies signi¯cantly lower
damages over the next two centuries. The Stern Review also describes
scenarios in which damages might be as high as 15-20% of income, a level
considerably above our scenario with ¢ = 0:2 (for the next two centuries).
The Stern Review assumes that climate-related damages are zero after
200 years, whereas in our calibration damages continue to rise for 800 years
and then decrease asymptotically to 0. The maximum level of D(t) equals
91¢%, i.e. 4.5%, 9.1% and 18.2% for the three values of ¢. In view of the
di®erent pro¯les of damages in the Stern Review and in our calibration, exact
matching is not possible. However, our case ¢ = 0:2 approximates one of
the high (but not the highest) Stern damage scenarios; the value ¢ = 0:1
approximates the Stern \market impacts + risk of catastrophe" scenario, and
the value ¢ = 0:05 corresponds to a much lower damage scenario.





¯°e¡°t + ±e¡±t(1 ¡ ¯)
¯e¡°t + e¡±t(1 ¡ ¯)
: (12)
8Using equation (10), PB(t) = 1 ¡ e¡at+(a¡h(0))(1¡e
¡¹t)=¹ and PS(t) = 1 ¡ e¡h(0)t.
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Figure 2: Percentage expected increased loss of income under BAU: ¢ = 0:05
(dashed); ¢ = 0:1 (solid); and ¢ = 0:2 (dotted).
We set ° = 0, so that the long-run pure rate of time preference is 0, and
choose ¯ and ± in order to satisfy
½(0) = 0:03 and ½(30) = 0:01:
Our value of ½(30) is ten times greater than the Stern Review's constant
pure rate of time preference.
3.2 Results
For a variety of parametric and equilibrium assumptions, we calculated upper
and lower bounds on X { the fraction of income-at-risk that society spends to
stabilize risk. These values were insensitive to choices of ¢ over the interval
(0:1;0:2), so the tables below report only results for ¢ = 0:2. We also report
14the corresponding constant equivalent discount rates. We discuss results for
g 2 [1%;2%] and ´ 2 [1;4]. As we noted above, when ´ = 1 the long run
e®ective discount rate is 0 and the integral in equation (3) (which plays no
role in determining the equilibrium) does not converge; moreover, the results
are extremely sensitive in the neighborhood of ´ = 1. This value is therefore
a special case. Consequently, we emphasize the case where 1:1 · ´ · 4 and
consider the case ´ = 1 separately.
Tables 1 { 3 show the (X) policy bounds and constant-equivalent ½ values
for the 6 cases corresponding to ´ 2 f1:1;2;4g and g 2 f0:01;0:02g. In
each case the constant equivalent social discount rate (not shown) equals
the constant equivalent value of ½ plus ´g. We emphasize the case where
´ = 2 and compare the results for g = 1% and g = 2% across the di®erent
equilibria.
We begin with the limited commitment equilibrium, which is both time
consistent and constrained optimal. For ´ = 2, the maximum fraction of the
income at risk that society would forgo in order to stabilize ranges between
6% and 17% as g changes from 2% to 1%. For these experiments, where
¢ = 0:2, these bounds imply expenditures of between 1.2% and 3.4% of
GWP. If ¢ = 0:1, the corresponding values of XC are 5.4% and 15.5%,
implying an expenditure of between 0.54% and 1.5% of GWP. These values
bracket the Stern recommendation to spend 1% of GWP annually on climate
change policy. For ¢ = 0:2, the constant equivalent values of ½ range
from 0.13% and 0.32%, so the constant equivalent social discount rate ranges
between 2.13% and 4.32%.
For g = 1% and ´ = 2 the upper and lower bounds of X in a MPE are
17.8% and 9.9%, with corresponding constant equivalent values of ½ of 0.1%
and 0.7% (Tables 2 and 3). In this case, for 17% < X < 17:8% of the value
at risk, the optimal policy is to follow BAU, but there are MPE that result
in excessive stabilization. For 9:9% < X < 17% the optimal policy is to
stabilize, but there are MPE that result in BAU. Thus, a MPE may result in
15Table 1: Limited commitment upper bounds XC and constant-equivalent ½
values for ´ £ g = f1:1;2;4g £ f0:01;0:02g.
g = 1% g = 2%
´ XC (%) Cons-equiv ½ (%) XC (%) Cons-equiv ½ (%)
1:1 76.22 0.01 60.71 0.02
2 17.1 0.13 6.07 0.32
4 3.78 0.53 1.06 1.09
either excessive or insu±cient stabilization (although, in a sense, the latter
is more likely). The broad range of values for which there are multiple MPE
indicates the importance of establishing commitment devices that enable the
current generation to lock in the desired policy trajectory.
Table 2: MPE upper bounds XU and constant-equivalent ½ values for
´ £ g = f1:1;2;4g £ f0:01;0:02g.
g = 1% g = 2%
´ XU (%) Cons-equiv ½ (%) XU (%) Cons-equiv ½ (%)
1:1 94.15 -0.08 81.55 -0.12
2 17.80 0.1 5.44 0.49
4 3.33 0.8 0.98 1.4
For g = 2% the upper and lower bounds (5.4% and 4%) are much closer
(compared to when g = 1%), and both lie below the upper bound under
restricted commitment. In this case, for any X such that stabilization is
a MPE, stabilization also maximizes welfare. For 5:4% < X < 6:1% all
MPE involve BAU even though stabilization is optimal. With g = 2% the
constant equivalent ½ in a MPE ranges from 0.5% to 1%. As expected, the
bounds are lower under the higher (g = 2%) growth rate, since the current
generation is less willing to sacri¯ce for the sake of much wealthier future
16generations.
Table 3: MPE lower bounds XL and constant-equivalent ½ values for
´ £ g = f1:1;2;4g £ f0:01;0:02g.
g = 1% g = 2%
´ XL (%) Cons-equiv ½ (%) XL (%) Cons-equiv ½ (%)
1:1 38.3 0.37 30.86 0.41
2 9.89 0.69 3.98 1.00
4 2.73 1.25 0.9 1.76
Table 4 in the appendix shows that in the neighborhood of ´ = 1 society
is willing to spend nearly all of the value at risk simply in order to reduce
the future risk. However, the case ´ = 1 and neighboring cases are actually
not informative. Recall that our model contains one free parameter when
´ 6= 1, and we used this degree of freedom to set ° = 0. Had we chosen a
positive value of °, we could have adjusted the values of g in all the previous
tables (where ´ 6= 1) without changing the results. However, the positive
value of ° would have caused a signi¯cant change in the results for ´ = 1.
Table 5 reports some bounds when we change the discounting calibration
so that ½(30) = 2% (rather than 1% as above). This rather modest change
in discounting assumptions leads to large percentage changes in the bounds
on X. This experiment reinforces the point that policy prescriptions can be
quite sensitive to assumptions about discount rates.
4 Conclusion
A constant discount rate cannot re°ect both a reasonable opportunity cost
of public funds and an ethically defensible concern for distant future gener-
ations. One way to reconcile these two goals is to let the social discount
rate vary over time. There are several reasons why the social discount rate
17might be a function of time. We emphasized the role of a declining pure
rate of time preference (hyperbolic discounting), which gives rise to time
inconsistency and a tendency to defer di±cult decisions.
In our binary action model, a reduction in current consumption (\sta-
bilization") reduces the future hazard rate of a random event that causes
permanent loss of utility. There are multiple Markov Perfect equilibria
(MPE) for an interval of stabilization costs. The upper bound of this inter-
val is the maximum cost consistent with a MPE involving stabilization; the
lower bound is the maximum cost consistent with a MPE involving BAU.
For each of these bounds we calculate a constant equivalent discount rate,
i.e. a constant discount rate that leads to the same decision rule as the time-
varying discount rate. We compared the set of MPE to a time-consistent
(constrained optimal) reference equilibrium. The MPE equilibrium set in-
dicates how much society would be willing to spend to stabilize the risk,
if it managed to solve the intragenerational collective action problem; the
reference equilibrium indicates how much society should be willing to spend.
Our risk and damage calibration includes the moderate and the high
damage estimates in the Stern Review. If the catastrophe reduces income
by 10-20%, the calibration implies a range of expected damages (under BAU)
of 1.4 - 2.9% after 100 years and 4 - 8% after 200 years. Our discounting
calibration assumes that the pure rate of time preference begins at 3%, falls
to 1% over the ¯rst 30 years, and then asymptotically declines to 0. As ´
(the elasticity of marginal utility) ranges between 2 and 4 and g (the growth
rate) ranges between 1% and 2%, the constant equivalent pure rate of time
preference ranges between 0.1% and 1.8% (depending on the equilibrium
assumption). For ´ = 2 and g = 2%, society is willing to spend between
0:5% ¡ 1% of GWP per year to reduce the risk in a MPE; society is willing
to spend between 0:6% ¡ 1:2% under limited commitment. A lower ´ or
lower g implies higher expenditures.
As the Stern Review emphasizes, quantitative models are valuable in pro-
18viding a reality check for policy prescriptions only when used in conjunction
with other qualitative and quantitative information. The limited empirical
basis for these models, and the fact that they inevitably incorporate value
judgements, means that they are unlikely to resolve policy disagreements.
Our model incorporates two important aspects of the policy problem: the
risk of abrupt events, and hyperbolic discounting (in order to re°ect both
the opportunity costs of public funds and a concern for future generations).
Moreover, it does so in a simple framework, making it easy to see the relation
between the policy conclusions presented above and our choice of parameters,
and to explore the e®ects of other parameter choices.
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21Appendix: Additional sensitivity results
Table 4: Additional runs to illustrate the senstivity of results in the neigh-
borhood of ´ = 1. Policy bounds and constant-equivalent ½ values when
´ £ g = f1:01;1:001;1g £ f0:01;0:02g.
X-bound (%) Cons-equiv ½ (%)
´ = 1:01; g = 1%
Limited commitment upper bound 94.96 0.00
MPE upper bound 99.79 -0.02
MPE lower bound 47.15 0.34
´ = 1:001; g = 1%
Limited commitment upper bound 97.18 0.00
MPE upper bound 99.94 -0.01
MPE lower bound 48.19 0.336609
´ = 1:01; g = 2%
Limited commitment upper bound 92.57 0.00235185
MPE upper bound 99.53 -0.0281171
MPE lower bound 45.99 0.343802
´ = 1:001; g = 2%
Limited commitment upper bound 96.92 0.00
MPE upper bound 99.92 -0.01
MPE lower bound 48.07 0.34
´ = 1
Limited commitment upper bound 97.43 0.00
MPE upper bound 99.95 -0.01
MPE lower bound 48.31 0.34
22Table 5: Sample of results when ½(30) = 2%.
X-bound (%) Cons-equiv ½ (%)
1. ´ = 2; g = 2%
Limited commitment upper bound 4.22 0.90
MPE upper bound 3.52 1.22
MPE lower bound 2.68 1.77
2. ´ = 2; g = 1%
Limited commitment upper bound 12.53 0.43
MPE upper bound 10.60 0.61
MPE lower bound 5.93157 1.35916
7. ´ = 4; g = 1%
Limited commitment upper bound 2.70 1.28
MPE upper bound 2.38 1.58
MPE lower bound 2.02 2.03
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